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HORIZONTAL MERGERS
ters. 9 Secondly, such irrational questioning can deter freedoms of
expression and association.4" In Hallinan, would it be unreasonable
to assume that future applicants would at least be leary of participa-
tion in civil rights demonstrations? Part of Justice Harlan's ration-
ale in refusing to allow the applicant to use the fifth amendment
was that no deterrence of association would result. But is this
realistic since the applicant has spent the last few years preparing
for entry into the legal profession and it is always questionable
whether an appellate court will reverse the exclusion in question?
Thus, the ultimate responsibility for establishing proper standards
to see if the applicant has "good moral character" lies with the bar
examining committee.
WAILACE C. TYSER, JR.
Antitrust Law-Horizontal Mergers-Section 7 of the
Clayton Act
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,' the Supreme Court
struck down a horizontal merger2 as a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. In March of 1960, when Von's, the third largest retail
grocery chain in the Los Angeles area, purchased the sixth largest,
the United States brought action charging an antitrust violation.
At trial, the District Court decided that from "the evidence, it can-
not be concluded that the merger in question would probably lessen
competition in the metropolitan area either at the time of the mergr
"o See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)."0 Justice Black said in the first Konigsberg case: "It is also important
both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to
think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar." Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957). See Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests
for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 480, 501 (1953). Another
bad result is the attitude such questioning produces in the applicants. It
perhaps tends to make them give only the "right" answers. Ibid. This is
bad not only because the applicant feels he has to hide some belief, but also
because it will hinder the committee from reaching conclusions based on
truthful answers.
'384 U.S. 270 (1966).
'A horizontal merger is a merger between two companies that compete
directly in similar economic functions, while a vertical merger is one be-
tween companies that buy or sell the product of the other, and a conglome-
rate merger is between companies that have no direct relationship with
each other.
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or in the foreseeable future."3 On appeal' the Supreme Court re-
versed, basing its decision predominantly on the facts that there had
been a continuing decline in the number of individually owned gro-
cery stores in the area and that chain stores had acquired an increas-
ing share of the market.
The first statutory expression of antitrust policy by Congress
was the Sherman Act of 1890,' enacted as an attempt to combat the
trend toward monopolistic control of the economy by gigantic busi-
ness trusts. Unfortunately, the Sherman Act was directed primarily
at the trust device and mergers were not prohibited unless an imme-
diate monopoly was created as a result. The statute did not refer to
the possible future effects of a merger.' Section 7 of the Clayton
Act,7 enacted in 1914, was an attempt by Congress to remedy these
deficiencies of the Sherman Act. However, Since Section 7 only
prevented illegal acquisition of corporate stock to effect merger, the
law could be circumnavigated by purchasing company assets rather
than stock in a merger operation.' The 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Amendment to Section 7 closed this loophole by applying the Clayton
provisions to assets as well as stock. The present statute is in this
form.'
In the decisions leading to Von's, most of the confusion has
centered around formulating a test under which the language of
Section 7, "may be substantially to lessen competition," can be ap-
plied. The first case to reach the Supreme Court after the Cellar-
Kefauver amendment was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.Y That
'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp. 976, 985 (S.D. Cal.
1964).
'Appeal was taken under the Federal Expediting Act, 62 Stat. 989
(1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
'26 Stat. 206 (1890).
'In invalidating a price-fixing agreement among railroads, the Supreme
Court looked only at the immediate effects of the agreement. United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
" 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
'Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); FTC
v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
0 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964): "No corporation engaged
in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." (Material added by the 1950 amendment is in italics.)"0370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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case involved both horizontal and vertical mergers, and, although
the background law concerning each type of merger was different,
the court applied only one test. Mr. Chief Justice Warren rejected
the idea that a mere quantitative analysis of the market share pro-
duced by the merger should be determinative of whether a violation
of Section 7 existed. Rather, the majority opinion indicated that a
broad economic analysis must be used in determining the anti-com-
petitive effects of a merger." The court in Brown Shoe also recog-
nized that the existence of a merger trend in a given line of com-
merce is an important factor that may require that the merger be
struck down, thus formulating the so-called incipiency doctrine. 2
The next important case involving section 7 was Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank.13 While the court did not there reject the broad eco-
nomic analysis used in Brown Shoe, it found that the bank merger
produced a firm controlling an "undue percentage share of the rele-
vant market" and resulted in a "significant increase in the concentra-
tion of firms in that market."' 4 In such circumstances the degree of
market control was alone large enough to create a presumption of
illegality and make it unnecessary to resort to the cumbersome
Brown Shoe test.'5 The reasoning in Philadelphia Bank was carried
a step further in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America6 and
United States v. Continental Can Co.' In each of these cases the
actual increase in market share by the acquiring companies was very
slight,'" unlike that in Philadelphia Bank. The court nevertheless
struck down these mergers, noting that the industries involved were
highly concentrated and that in each case the mergers involved the
acquisition of a viable competitor by an industry leader.
The Supreme Court's difficulties in analyzing merger cases must
' Id. at 321-322.
2 "Third, it is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to
what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its
provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to
a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency."
Id. at 363.
" United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"'Id. at 363. The merger resulted in a 30 per cent share of the market by
the acquiring bank and a control of 78 per cent of the market by the top four
banks.
5 Id. at 363-64.
18377 U.S. 271 (1964).
17378 U.S. 441 (1964).
'8In the Aluminum Co. and Continental Can cases, the increase in mar-
ket share was less than 3 per cent in each case; however, the resulting com-
bined market shares were 29 per cent, 25 per cent respectively.
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be attributed to the very nature of the problem itself. The statutory
language is in effect a broad grant of power to the Court to decide
for itself the distinction between good and bad mergers. This re-
quires that the Court predict the effect of a merger before declaring
it invalid.'" But economics is an inexact science and even eco-
nomists themselves cannot predict with certainty the future effects of
a merger. 0 The cost and time of accumulating sufficient data for a
proper analysis is prohibitive and, indeed, the data may even be mis-
leading to judges and lawyers lacking the necessary understanding of
economic theory. In viewing the decisions from Brown Shoe through
Von's, it seems that the Court must be recognizing this fact and is try-
ing to formulate a simple test for applying Section 7. In Philadelphia
Bank, Aluminum Co., and Continental Can, the Court in essence
decided that the resulting share of the market after merger was
simply too large in already concentrated industries and those merg-
ers were invalidated largely on that basis. Even though in Von's
the resulting market share was only seven and one-half per cent,2
far below that in the other cases, the merger was nevertheless in-
validated, primarily because of a decreasing number of small com-
petitiors in the same line of commerce.'
This attitude of the Court toward the individually-owned busi-
ness suggests that something more than a desire for a "simple"
Section 7 test underlines the Von's decision. From the history of
antitrust litigation has emerged the idea that a system of small com-
petitors is somehow inherently desirable2 3 This proposition has not
"o This point was virtually sidestepped by the majority in Voi's. See
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent: "The Court has substituted bare conjecture
for the statutory standard of a reasonable probability that competition may
be lessened." 384 U.S. 270 at 286.
2 Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 226, 228 (1960).
" Before the merger, Von's had 4.7 per cent of the sales of the relevant
market while Shopping Bag Food Stores, the acquired company, had 4.2
per cent of the total sales. The sales of the largest firm comprised 8 per
cent of the market.
2 What we have .. . is simply the case of two already powerful
companies merging in a way which makes them even more powerful
than they were before. If ever such a merger would not violate § 7,
certainly it does when it takes place in a market characterized by a
long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-competi-
tors.... United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78
(1966).
" See Judge Learned Hand's view of antitrust laws in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945): "Throughout the
history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their
[voi. 451018
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gone unquestioned.2 4 Indeed, the very nature of the grocery store
business demonstrates a fallacy in this idea. Supermarket chains
certainly compete more among themselves than do small comer gro-
cery stores sprinkled across a city, and the larger stores usually offer
a better selection of products, often at lower prices. It surely must
be asked whether the small competitor should be protected if cir-
cumstances have already made it difficult for him to compete,2 5 espe-
cially when the interests of the consumer and the industrious, expan-
sion-minded store owner may suffer.
At any rate, the present test for legality of mergers under Section
7 is vague.26 The businessman is not given any ascertainable stan-
dard when considering a. merger. In fact, as Mr. Justice Stewart
remarked, "The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation
under Section 7, the Government always wins."27 Granted that this
statement is very close to the truth, it is still difficult to say that the
Supreme Court was wrong in Von's. A merger, once allowed, is a
permanent condition, and it is better to stop a trend toward oligop-
oly too soon than too late. Although the Von's merger apparently
did not injure competition, the door would have been open for simi-
lar mergers if this one had been allowed. The trend toward concen-
tration had to be stopped at some point, and the Court cannot be
seriously castigated for acting when it did.
D. J. JONES, JR.
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively
compete with each other." Id. at 429.
"4 Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 54 GEo. L.J. 891 (1966). The author questions the wisdom
of prohibiting mergers which increase efficiency and competition.
5 It is not as difficult for small stores in Los Angeles to compete with the
larger ones as the majority opinion in Von's would lead one to believe. In
some cases the large, retailer-owned cooperative buying organizations in
the area "were able to offer even lower prices to their members than com-
peting chains could obtain." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 299, n. 32 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"0 Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitntst Policymaking, 76 YALE L.J.
92, 108-109 (1966).
"'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting). In the past eleven years the justice Department has won
forty-five of fifty antitrust cases before the Supreme Court. The Federal
Trade Commission has not lost a single antitrust case before the Court in
seven years.
